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Environmental Regulations in Private and Mixed Duopolies: 
Emission Taxes versus Green R&D Subsidies 
Sang-Ho Lee* and Chul-Hi Park** 
Abstract 
In the presence of R&D spillovers, we compare environmental regulations between emission 
taxes and green R&D subsidies in private and mixed duopoly markets. We show that the green 
R&D subsidy is better (worse) than the emission tax when the green R&D cost is low (high) 
irrespective of the R&D spillovers, whereas the existence of a public firm encourages the 
government to adopt the subsidy policy. We then show that the optimal policy choice depends 
on the level of the R&D cost and the degree of R&D spillovers. In particular, when the R&D 
cost is high and the spillover rate is (not) weak, the government should choose the emission tax 
and (not) privatize the public firm. However, when the R&D cost is low, such a privatization 
policy is not desirable to society irrespective of the R&D spillovers. 
Keywords: emission tax; green R&D subsidy; R&D spillovers; privatization policy 
JEL Classification: L13; L21; M14 
I. Introduction 
Over the past generation, environmental policies have been implemented in polluting 
industries across the world given the global concern about climate change. As part of the Paris 
COP21 agreement an important number of countries in the world submitted independent 
nationally determined contributions along with environmental policies, including market-
oriented mechanisms and stricter emission standards. For example, many progressive countries 
have already adopted market-based environmental regulation by using emission taxes, cap-and-
trades, and pollution abatement (green R&D) subsidies.1 
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 For example, the USA implemented permits trading systems such as the sulfur dioxide (SO2) trading program, 
in which allowances were freely allocated under the Clean Air Act, and California's CO2 cap-and-trade program. 
Also, many countries including the EU and China introduced this program gradually during the last decade. 
Nowadays, it becomes a successful international experiment for controlling a large amount of greenhouse gases in 
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In the academic literature, researchers have devoted considerable efforts to evaluate 
various initiatives by using a range of theoretical and empirical approaches. Since 1990s, many 
economists explored the effect of emission taxes or/and tradeable permit systems in polluting 
markets. They showed that governments can promote social welfare by implementing market 
allocation of tradable permits (quantity regulation) or emission taxes (price regulation) since 
those mechanisms can minimize abatement costs when there are differences with respect to the 
abatement technologies among regulated firms.2 Further, a public policy with a green R&D 
subsidy has long been proposed to accelerate the adoption and diffusion of cleaner technologies 
and help support environment-friendly products.3 
On the other hand, from the administrative perspective of the ownership of the firms, 
technological and managerial improvements in public domains have shown the possible 
benefits of public ownership in polluting industries. Research encouraging the development of 
cleaner technologies is being paid more attention by governments with mixed markets where 
private firms compete against public firms which care for environment.4 As a first attempt, 
Beladi and Chao (2006) examined the environmental effect of public ownership while Bárcena-
Ruiz and Garzon (2006) and Ohori (2006) investigated the effect of privatization policy on 
environmental regulation. Since then, a series of research have explored the interaction between 
privatization policy and environmental regulation, but relatively few economic analyses have 
addressed the comparative welfare effects of different policy instruments in polluting 
industries.5 
In fact, comparing emission taxes with green R&D subsidies in oligopolies has clear policy 
importance for developing a sustainable system. There have been considerable empirical and 
                                           
the world. Stavins (1998), Kato (2006), Burtraw and McCormack (2017) and Garcia et al. (2018) introduced some 
useful real-world discussions on the tradable emission permits as climate change policy instrument in the UN and 
the USA. 
2 See, for example, Borenstein (1988), Malueg (1990), Requate (1993), Sartzetakis (1997, 2004), Lee and Park 
(2005) and Garcia et al. (2018) among others. 
3 On the effectiveness of green R&D subsidies, see, for example, Stranlund (1997), Poyago-Theotoky (1998, 1999, 
2003), David and Sinclair-Desgagne (2005, 2010), and Lee and Park (2011, 2019). 
4 Mixed markets now exist in a broad range of industries that emit pollutants in the production process, such as 
oil, gas, automobile, steel, chemical, electricity, power generation, and healthcare. In transition economies, many 
state-owned industries are reliant on highly polluting technologies.  
5 However, environmental concerns in a mixed market have been analyzed by several researchers relatively 
recently. For example, Kato (2013), Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2014), Pal and Saha (2015), Xu and Lee (2015), 
Xu et al. (2016), Haruna and Goel (2017, 2018), Lee and Xu (2018) and Ouattrara (2019) have explored the effect 
of product differentiation, partial privatization and tariff on the environmental policy. 
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theoretical works on R&D incentives and policy implications. A significant number of research 
has concluded that both the R&D spillovers and the effectiveness of the R&D cost are critical 
to assess the welfare effect of governmental intervention.6 For example, Poyago-Theotoky 
(2003) investigated the effect of emission taxes and green R&D subsidies in a differentiated 
goods duopoly, and compared the market conduct between Cournot and Bertrand in order to 
find optimal environmental policy. Youssef and Dinar (2011) analyzed the optimal combination 
of emission taxes and R&D subsidies, and showed that R&D investment is taxed when the 
marginal damage cost of pollution is sufficiently high. Poyago-Theotoky and Yong (2019) 
examined managerial compensation contract in a Cournot duopoly and showed that the level of 
green R&D cost is crucial to the effect of an emission tax on the green R&D decisions. 
However, the parametric properties of green R&D technologies such as R&D spillovers and the 
effectiveness of R&D cost and the progressive role of government ownership on the 
environmental policy are not sufficiently discussed. 
In the recent development on green R&D policy in mixed markets, several works have 
provided a significant relationship between the government ownership and green R&D 
technologies. For example, Haruna and Goel (2019) examined the effect of emission taxes on 
green R&D investment in a mixed market and showed that privatization can lead to reductions 
in R&D and output. Further, Ouattara (2019) studies the impact of partial privatization on firm’s 
R&D investment under the emission taxes. However, policy comparisons between emission 
taxes and green R&D subsidies have attracted insufficient attention in contrast to the key role 
of government policy in facilitating environmental innovation. 
In this study, we examine policy comparisons between emission taxes and green R&D 
subsidies in both private and mixed markets, respectively, and investigate policy interactions 
with R&D spillovers and the level of R&D cost. We show that the green R&D subsidy is better 
for society than the emission tax when the R&D cost is low irrespective of the R&D spillovers. 
This is because a green R&D subsidy is more effective to firms’ R&D investments, which can 
directly reduce the environmental damages with the lower emission abatement cost. However, 
the reverse occurs when the R&D cost is high. In that case, emission tax can reduce the output 
productions directly, which can indirectly reduce the environmental damages under the higher 
                                           
6 See Poyago-Theotoky (1995, 1999, 2003) and Beath et al. (1998) for early discussions in private markets and 
Gil-Moltó et al. (2011), Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013), Lee and Tomaru (2017), Lee et al. (2017), Haruna and Goel 
(2015, 2017, 2018) and Ouattara (2019) for recent discussions in mixed markets. 
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emission abatement cost. We also show that public firm will be more aggressive in R&D 
investments and output productions only when the R&D cost is low. Therefore, the existence 
of a public firm will encourage the government to adopt the green R&D subsidy policy rather 
than emission taxes. 
We then examine the welfare effect of privatization policy and analyze its policy relation 
with environmental regulations. We show that when the R&D cost is low, the privatization 
policy does not improve social welfare irrespective of the R&D spillovers. Since public firm is 
more aggressive in the market activities when the R&D cost is low, it can achieve cost efficiency 
from the R&D investments and allocation efficiency from output production. However, when 
the R&D cost is high, the government should choose the emission tax whereas the privatization 
policy depends crucially on the degree of R&D spillovers. In particular, the public firm should 
be privatized if the spillover effect is weak, while it should not be privatized otherwise. This is 
because the public firm can increase allocative efficiency from higher output productions only 
when the spillover effect is strong. Otherwise, however, privatization policy is beneficial to the 
society because there exists a trade-off between cost efficiency and allocation efficiency in the 
presence of a public firm. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the basic 
model of environmental regulations. In sections 3 and 4, we provide the equilibrium results in 
private and mixed markets, respectively. We then compare the welfare effects of two policies 
in section 5. Finally, we conclude our analysis in section 6. 
II. The Model 
We consider a duopoly with homogeneous products, firm 0 and firm 1, facing a linear 
inverse demand function, 𝑃 = 𝐴 − 𝑄, where 𝐴 is market size, 𝑞𝑖 is each firm’s output and 𝑄 = 𝑞0 + 𝑞1 is total market output. For comparison purpose, we assume that each firm has a 
quadratic production cost of output,7 𝑐(𝑞𝑖) = 12 𝑞𝑖2, for firm i = 0, 1. The output of each firm 
emits pollution, 𝑒𝑖 . For analytic simplicity, we normalize the emission efficiency and we 
assume that each unit of output generates one unit of pollution, 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖. We additionally adopt 
a green R&D investment, 𝑧𝑖 , which has the spillover effect, 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] . Then, the emission 
                                           
7 The model with linear demand and quadratic cost functions is a standard formulation and popularly used in the 
literature on mixed oligopolies in order to rule out the uninteresting case of a public monopoly. 
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function affected by green R&D investment is modified as: 𝑒𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑧𝑖 , 𝑧𝑗 , 𝛽) = 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑧𝑖 − 𝛽𝑧𝑗 . 
That is, the emission emitted by firm i can be reduced by not only its own R&D but also the 
other firm’s R&D with the R&D spillover effect, 𝛽 . We also assume that each firm has a 
quadratic R&D cost: 𝛾2 𝑧𝑖2 where 𝛾 > 0 is the level of green R&D cost and is assumed to 
satisfy that8 𝛾 > γ. Thus, higher (lower) 𝛾 represents the high (low) level of the green R&D 
cost. Then, the profit function of the firm without any environmental regulation becomes: 𝜋𝑖 = (𝐴 − 𝑄)𝑞𝑖 − 12 𝑞𝑖2 − 𝛾2 𝑧𝑖2.                                              (1) 
It is easy to see that the firm has no incentive to invest in green R&D, 𝑧𝑖 = 0. 
Finally, environmental damage function is given as: 𝐷(𝐸) = 𝐸2  where 𝐸 = 𝑒0 + 𝑒𝑖 
denotes total emissions. Then, marginal environmental damage becomes 𝑀𝐷𝐸 = 2𝐸. Social 
welfare can be calculated as the aggregated sum of the consumer and producer surpluses less 
environmental damage: 𝑊 = ∫ (𝐴 − 𝑢) ⅆ𝑢𝑄0 − 12 ∑(𝑞𝑖2 + 𝛾𝑧𝑖2)1𝑖=0 − 𝐸2                                 (2) 
As a benchmark, it is worthy to note that the first-best (FB) outcomes that directly maximizes 
welfare in (2) is as follows: 𝑄FB = 2𝐴(4(1+𝛽)2+𝛾)12(1+𝛽)2+7𝛾  and 𝑍FB = 8𝐴(1+𝛽)12(1+𝛽)2+7𝛾                                     (3) 
In the following analysis, we consider two typical environmental regulations, an emission 
tax and a green R&D subsidy, in both private and mixed markets. We assume that each private 
firm maximizes its regulated profits in the private market, while the public firm maximizes 
social welfare in the mixed market where the private and public firms coexist. 
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the government sets environmental 
regulation to maximize social welfare. In the second stage, each firm chooses its R&D cost to 
maximize its own objectives individually and simultaneously. In the third stage, both firms 
compete in outputs to maximize their own objectives. We will solve all games by backward 
induction and find subgame perfect Nash equilibria. 
                                           
8 In Appendix A, we define γ > 0. This assumption ensures that all the equilibrium outcomes are positive. 
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III. Private Market 
In a private market, both firms are profit-oriented entities without concerning the environment 
but each private firm maximizes its regulated profits under environmental regulations. We will 
examine an emission tax and a green R&D subsidy regulation, respectively, and compare the 
welfare consequences. 
3. 1. Emission Tax 
Under the emission tax, the objective function of the private firm of which unregulated 
profit is (1) becomes as follows: 𝑇𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖 − 𝑡(𝑞𝑖 − 𝑧𝑖 − 𝛽𝑧𝑗)                                                 (4) 
In the third stage of output competition, we have the following equilibrium quantities: 𝑞𝑖 = 𝐴 − 𝑡4                                                               (5) 
Equilibrium output decreases as the emission tax increases, as expected. This implies that the 
emission tax directly affects the output decision of the firms. 
In the second stage of R&D competition, we have the following equilibrium green R&D: 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑡𝛾                                                                  (6) 
There is a positive relationship between green R&D and the emission tax, but its effect is 
disproportional to the level of R&D cost. 
In the first stage, the government decides the following optimal emission tax:9  𝑡𝑇𝑃 = 𝐴𝛾(16(1 + 𝛽) + 3𝛾)4(4(1 + 𝛽) + 𝛾)2 + 𝛾(16 + 3𝛾)                                       (7) 
                                           
9 Solving this problem gives the following first-order condition:  (𝐴 − 𝑄(𝑡)) dQdt − ∑ 𝑞𝑖(𝑡) dq𝑖dt1𝑖=0 − 𝛾 ∑ 𝑧𝑖(𝑡) dz𝑖dt1𝑖=0 − MED(dQdt − (1 + 𝛽) dZdt) = 0.  The first term on the left-hand side measures the loss from decreasing the utility of the representative consumer, 
the second term measures the benefit from decreasing the output production cost, the third term measures the loss 
from increasing the R&D cost, and the last term measures the benefit from the reduction in environmental damage, 
all caused by an increase in the emission tax. 
7 
 
where the superscript TP denotes the optimal emission tax in private market. Note that the 
optimal emission tax increases as the R&D cost parameter increases.10 However, it decreases 
(increases) as the R&D spillover effect increases the R&D cost is low (high).11 
Then, we obtain the equilibrium outcomes under the emission tax in the private market: 
𝑞𝑖𝑇𝑃 = 𝐴(16𝛽2 + (4 + 𝛾)2 + 4𝛽(8 + 𝛾))64(1 + 𝛽)2 + 16(3 + 2𝛽)𝛾 + 7𝛾2                                      (8) 𝑧𝑖𝑇𝑃 = 𝐴(16 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛾)4(4 + 4𝛽 + 𝛾)2 + 𝛾(16 + 3𝛾)                                         (9) 𝑒𝑖𝑇𝑃 = 𝐴𝛾(5 + 𝛽 + 𝛾)64(1 + 𝛽)2 + 16(3 + 2𝛽)𝛾 + 7𝛾2                                     (10) 
Comparing the first-best outcomes, we have 𝑄FB > Q𝑇𝑃 and Z𝐹𝐵 > 𝑍𝑇𝑃. This shows that 
emission tax policy is insufficient not only in green R&D investment but the output production. 
Hence, there are both under-investment and under-production under emission tax regulation, 
which results in cost inefficiency from the R&D investments and allocation inefficiency from 
output production. 
Finally, social welfare under the emission tax in the private market is as follows: 
𝑊𝑇𝑃 = 𝐴2(20(1 + 𝛽)2 + (9 + 8𝛽)𝛾 + 𝛾2)64(1 + 𝛽)2 + 16(3 + 2𝛽)𝛾 + 7𝛾2                                    (11) 
We have the following lemma.12 
Lemma 1.  𝑡TP <> 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑃 ⟺ 𝛾 >< 4(3𝛽 − 1) 
It indicates that the emission tax depends on the level of green R&D cost and spillover effect. 
In particular, if spillover effect is low, 𝛽 ≤ 13,  then the emission tax is always lower than 
marginal environmental damage. This result is consistent to the traditional tax rule that the 
                                           
10 That is, 𝜕𝑡𝑇𝑃𝜕𝛾 = 16(64(1+𝛽)3+24(1+𝛽)2𝛾+(2−𝛽)𝛾2)(64(1+𝛽)2+16(3+2𝛽)𝛾+7𝛾2)2 > 0. 
11 That is, 𝜕𝑡TP𝜕𝛽 <> 0 ⟺ 𝛾 <> 4(1 + 3𝛽 + √5 + 𝛽(14 + 13𝛽)). Regarding the R&D cost is low (high), the optimal 
emission tax decreases (increases) as 𝛽 increases. 
12 All the proofs of the lemmas and propositions are provided in Appendix B. 
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optimal emission rate in imperfectly competitive markets falls short of the Pigouvian rule, i.e., 
marginal environmental damage. 13  This is because the lower emission tax can directly 
encourage the output decision of the firms. However, if spillover effect is high, the emission 
tax with the low (high) R&D cost can be higher (lower) than the marginal environmental 
damage in order to internalize the externalities.  
3. 2. Green R&D Subsidy 
Under the green R&D subsidy, the objective function of the private firm is as follows: 𝑇𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖 + 𝑠𝑧𝑖                                                            (12) 
In the third stage of output competition, we have the following equilibrium quantities: 𝑞𝑖 = 𝐴4                                                                  (13) 
It is noteworthy that a green R&D does not affect the output decision of the firms. 
In the second stage of R&D competition, we have the following equilibrium green R&D: 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑠𝛾                                                                (14) 
There is also a positive relationship between green R&D investment and the R&D subsidy, but 
its effect is disproportional to the level of green R&D cost. 
In the first stage, the government decides the following optimal green R&D subsidy:14 𝑠𝑆𝑃 = 𝐴(1 + 𝛽)𝛾4(1 + 𝛽)2 + 𝛾                                                  (15) 
where the superscript SP denotes the equilibrium under the green R&D subsidy in the private 
market. Note that the green R&D subsidy increases as the level of green R&D cost increases15. 
                                           
13 See, for example, Barnett (1980) for a monopoly and Levin (1985) for an oligopoly. 
14 Solving this problem gives the following first-order condition:  𝑀𝐸𝐷((1 + 𝛽) 𝑑𝑍𝑑𝑠) − 𝛾 ∑ 𝑧𝑖(𝑠) 𝑑𝑧𝑖𝑑𝑠1𝑖=0 = 0.  The first term on the left-hand side measures the loss from increasing the R&D cost and the second term measures 
the benefit from the reduction in environmental damage, all caused by an increase in the subsidy. 
15 That is, 𝜕𝑠SP𝜕𝛾 = 4𝐴(1+𝛽)3(4(1+𝛽)2+𝛾)2 > 0 
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However, it decreases (increases) as the R&D spillover effect increases under the low (high) 
R&D cost.16 
Then, we obtain the equilibrium outcomes under the green R&D subsidy in the private 
market: 𝑞𝑖 𝑆𝑃 = 𝐴4                                                               (16) 𝑧𝑖 𝑆𝑃 = 𝐴(1 + 𝛽)4(1 + 𝛽)2 + 𝛾                                                     (17) 𝑒𝑖 𝑆𝑃 = 𝐴𝛾4(4(1 + 𝛽)2 + 𝛾)                                                  (18) 
Comparing the first-best outcomes, we have 𝑄FB >< 𝑄𝑆𝑃 and Z𝐹𝐵 >< Z𝑆𝑃 , depending on the 
levels of green R&D cost and spillover effect. This shows that the welfare consequences of the 
green R&D subsidy depends crucially on the cost and spillovers of green R&D investment. 
However, comparing emission tax outcomes, we have 𝑄𝑆𝑃 > Q𝑇𝑃 and 𝑍𝑆𝑃 > 𝑍𝑇𝑃. It implies 
that the green R&D subsidy induces more output production and more R&D investment than 
the emission tax in a private market. Therefore, depending on the level of green R&D cost and 
spillover effect, the green R&D subsidy can increase not only cost efficiency from the R&D 
investments and allocation efficiency from output production. 
Finally, social welfare under the green R&D subsidy in the private market is as follows: 
𝑊𝑆𝑃 = 𝐴2(20(1 + 𝛽)2 + 𝛾)16(4(1 + 𝛽)2 + 𝛾)                                                (19) 
Lemma 2. 𝑠SP > 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑃 
It states that the optimal green R&D subsidy is always higher than marginal environmental 
damage irrespective of the level of R&D cost and spillovers. This is because the R&D subsidy 
                                           
16 That is, 𝜕𝑠SP𝜕𝛽 = 𝐴𝛾(𝛾−4(1+𝛽)2)(4(1+𝛽)2+𝛾)2 <> 0 ⟺ 𝛾 <> 4(1 + 𝛽)2. Regarding the R&D cost is low (high), the optimal 
emission tax decreases (increases) as 𝛽 increases. 
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can encourage not only R&D investments directly but total emission amounts indirectly,17 
compared to emission tax, and thus the government will set higher R&D subsidy rate than 
marginal environmental damage in order to increase more output production and more R&D 
investment. 
3. 3. Comparisons 
We compare social welfare between under the emission tax and under the green R&D subsidy 
in the private market. 
Proposition 1. WSP <> WTP ⟺ γ >< 2(1 + 𝛽)9 (√(313 + 𝛽(98 + 361𝛽)) − (5 − 19𝛽)) ≡ 𝛾𝑃 
It shows that the superiority of the regulatory instruments between the emission tax and the 
green R&D subsidy in a private market depends not only on the spillover effect but also on the 
level of the R&D cost. In particular, social welfare under the emission tax can be higher (lower) 
than those under the green R&D subsidy with the higher (lower) R&D cost. Note that welfare 
thresholds, 𝛾𝑃, is increasing in the spillovers, i.e., 𝜕𝛾𝑃𝜕𝛽 > 0. 
IV. Mixed Duopoly 
In a mixed market where the private and public firms coexist, it is assumed that the private 
firm maximizes its regulated profits while the public firm maximizes social welfare. We will 
also examine an emission tax and a green R&D subsidy regulation, respectively, and compare 
the welfare consequences. 
4. 1. Emission Tax 
Under the emission tax, the public firm maximizes social welfare in (2), while the private 
firm maximizes its own objective function in (4). In the third stage of output competition, we 
have the following equilibrium quantities: 
                                           
17 If we put the equilibrium outcomes in (13) and (14) into 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑧𝑖 − 𝛽𝑧𝑗, we have 𝑒𝑖SP(𝑠) = 𝐴𝛾−4𝑠(1+𝛽)4𝛾 . 
Then, we can show that 𝜕𝑒𝑖SP(𝑠)𝜕𝑠 = − 1+𝛽𝛾 < 0. 
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𝑞0 = 3𝑡 + 6(1 + 𝛽)(𝑧0 + 𝑧1)9                                               (20) 𝑞1 = 3𝐴 − 4𝑡 − 2(1 + 𝛽)(𝑧0 + 𝑧1)9                                           (21) 𝑄 = 3𝐴 − 𝑡 + 4(1 + 𝛽)(𝑧0 + 𝑧1)9                                            (22) 
Then, the equilibrium output of the public (private) firm increases (decreases) as either the 
emission tax or the R&D cost increases. Thus, emission tax can encourage the public firm to be 
more aggressive in output production but, because the outputs are strategic substitutes, 
discourage the private firm to be more passive. As the cost of R&D investment is low, the public 
firm which already produces too much output, will be less aggressive and encourage the private 
firm to produce more in order to save social production cost. That is, there is an output 
substitution effect that is increases as the cost of R&D investment increases. However, total 
market output decreases (increases) as the emission tax (R&D investment) increases. 
In the second stage of R&D competition, we have the following equilibrium green R&D: 
𝑧0 = 2(1 + 𝛽)(22𝐴(1 + 𝛽)2 + 90𝐴𝛾 − 𝑡(199 + 𝛽(239 + 40𝛽) + 48𝛾))3𝛾(94(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾)            (23) 
𝑧1 = 2𝑡(1 + 𝛽)2(199 + 40𝛽) − 44𝐴(1 + 𝛽)3 − 54𝐴(1 + 𝛽)𝛾 + 9𝑡(35 + 8𝛽)𝛾3𝛾(94(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾)      (24) 𝑍 = 𝑡(73 − 8𝛽) + 42𝐴(1 + 𝛽)94(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾                                             (25) 
Note that the public firm’s R&D decreases as the emission tax increases, whereas the private 
firm’s R&D increases. This implies that from the viewpoint of government policy, the decisions 
on the emission tax and the public firm’s R&D investment are strategically substitutable policy 
instruments.    
In the first stage, the government decides the following optimal emission tax: 
𝑡𝑇𝑀 = 2𝐴(88𝐿5(199 + 40𝛽) + 6𝐿3(9883 + 1900𝛽)𝛾 + 27𝐿(1517 + 464𝛽)𝛾2 + 4374𝛾3)𝐾   (26) 
where the superscript TM denotes the optimal emission tax in mixed market, 𝐿 = (1 + 𝛽) and 𝐾 = 8𝐿4(199 + 40𝛽)2 + 6𝐿2(77701 + 8𝛽(5920 + 1037𝛽))𝛾 + 9(21985 + 16𝛽(1361 + 397𝛽))𝛾2 + 20412𝛾3. 
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Then, we obtain the equilibrium outcomes under the emission tax in the mixed market: 
𝑞𝑜𝑇𝑀 = 6𝐴(8𝐿4(13 + 3𝛽)(199 + 40𝛽) + 2𝐿2(11905 + 𝛽(8561 + 1516𝛽))𝛾 + 3𝐿(2201 + 824𝛽)𝛾2 + 486𝛾3)𝐾    (27) 𝑞1𝑇𝑀 = 3𝐴(88𝐿4(199+40𝛽)+2𝐿2(11375+8𝛽(278+61𝛽))𝛾+3(2827+640𝛽(2+𝛽))𝛾2+972𝛾3)𝐾          (28)  𝑧𝑜𝑇𝑀 = 4𝐴𝐿(2(1+𝛽)2(11957+5686𝛽+884𝛽2)+9(2501+2𝛽(917+274𝛽))𝛾+2916𝛾2)𝐾                (29)  𝑧1𝑇𝑀 = 4𝐴(2𝐿3(9137+2𝛽(869−122𝛽))+3𝐿(5413+8𝛽(181−40𝛽))𝛾+243(7−2𝛽)𝛾2)𝐾                (30)  𝑒0𝑇𝑀 = 2𝐴(4𝐿4(5+2𝛽)(713+482𝛽)+6𝐿2(4402+𝛽(5149+1836𝛽))𝛾+9(1553+𝛽(1999+932𝛽))𝛾2+1458𝛾3)𝐾 (31)  𝑒1𝑇𝑀 = 𝐴(6𝐿2(549−4𝛽(1213+700𝛽))𝛾+9(2071+8(25−82𝛽)𝛽)𝛾2+2916𝛾3−16𝐿4(5+2𝛽)(257+221𝛽))𝐾    (32)  
Comparing the first-best outcomes, we have 𝑄FB > Q𝑇𝑀 and Z𝐹𝐵 > 𝑍𝑇𝑀. This shows that 
even in the presence of public firm, the emission tax policy is insufficient not only in green 
R&D investment but the output production. There are still both under-investment and under-
production under emission tax regulation, which results in cost inefficiency from the R&D 
investments and allocation inefficiency from output production. 
Finally, social welfare under the emission tax in the mixed market is as follows: 
𝑊𝑇𝑀 = 𝐴2(8𝐿4(12317+8𝛽(575+49𝛽))+2𝐿2(57695+8𝛽(4265+688𝛽))𝛾+9(3817+8𝛽(529+143𝛽))𝛾2+2916𝛾3)𝐾              (33)  
Lemma 3. 𝑡TM <> 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑀 ⟺ 𝛾 >< 𝛾𝑇𝑀 where 𝛾𝑇𝑀 > γ and satisfies 𝑡TM = 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑀.18  
It states that depending on the level of green R&D cost and spillover effect, the optimal emission 
tax in a mixed market can be higher (lower) than the marginal environmental damage under the 
low (high) green R&D cost. This result is similar with Lemma 1. Thus, the emission tax with 
the low (high) R&D cost can be higher (lower) than the marginal environmental damage in 
order to internalize the externalities. 
 
                                           
18 We can show that 0 < γ < 𝛾𝑇𝑀 in Appendix B. 
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4. 2. Green R&D Subsidy 
Under the green R&D subsidy, the public firm maximizes social welfare in (2), while the 
private firm maximizes its own objective function in (12). In the third stage of output 
competition, the first-order conditions yield the following equilibrium quantities: 𝑞0 = 2(1 + 𝛽)(𝑧0 + 𝑧1)3                                                    (34) 𝑞1 = 3𝐴 − 2(1 + 𝛽)(𝑧0 + 𝑧1)9                                               (35) 𝑄 = 3𝐴 + 4(1 + 𝛽)(𝑧0 + 𝑧1)9                                                (36) 
This shows that both the output of the public (private) firm and total market output increase 
(decrease) as green R&D increases. Thus, contrary to the private market, the presence of public 
firm change the output effect of a green R&D subsidy policy. In specific, due to the output 
substitution effect between the two public and private firms, a green R&D subsidy encourages 
the public firm’s output, which in return reduce the private firm’s output. 
In the second stage of green R&D competition, we have the following equilibrium green 
R&D: 
𝑧0 = 2(1 + 𝛽)(22𝐴(1 + 𝛽)2 + 90𝐴𝛾 − 159𝑠(1 + 𝛽))3𝛾(94(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾)                           (37) 
𝑧1 = 𝑠(318(1 + 𝛽)2 + 243𝛾) − (1 + 𝛽)𝐴(44(1 + 𝛽)2 + 54𝛾)3𝛾(94(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾)                    (38) 𝑍 = 81𝑠 + 42𝐴(1 + 𝛽)94(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾                                                    (39) 
The public firm’s R&D decreases as the green R&D subsidy increases, whereas the private 
firm’s R&D and total R&D increase. This implies that from the viewpoint of government 
policy, the decisions on the green R&D subsidy and the public firm’s R&D investment are 
strategically substitutable policy instruments.    
In the first stage, in which the government decides the optimal green R&D subsidy, the 
first-order condition yields the following: 
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𝑠𝑆𝑀 = 88𝐴(1 + 𝛽)3 + 234𝐴(1 + 𝛽)𝛾636(1 + 𝛽)2 + 243𝛾                                        (40) 
where the superscript SM denotes the optimal green R&D subsidy in the mixed market. 
Then, we obtain the equilibrium outcomes under the green R&D subsidy in the mixed market: 
𝑞𝑜 𝑆𝑀 = 80𝐴(1 + 𝛽)2212(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾                                                (41) 
𝑞1𝑆𝑀 = 44𝐴(1 + 𝛽)2 + 27𝐴𝛾212(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾                                               (42) 𝑧𝑜 𝑆𝑀 = 60𝐴(1 + 𝛽)212(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾                                                (43) 𝑧1𝑆𝑀 = 60𝐴(1 + 𝛽)212(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾                                                 (44) 
𝑒0𝑆𝑀 = 20𝐴(1 + 𝛽)2212(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾                                                 (45) 
𝑒1𝑆𝑀 = 𝐴(27𝛾 − 16(1 + 𝛽)2)212(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾                                               (46) 
Comparing the first-best outcomes, we have 𝑄FB >< 𝑄𝑆𝑀 and Z𝐹𝐵 >< Z𝑆𝑀 , depending on the 
level of green R&D cost. This also shows that the welfare consequences of the green R&D 
subsidy depends crucially on the cost level and spillover effect of R&D investment. However, 
comparing emission tax outcomes, we have 𝑄𝑆𝑀 > Q𝑇𝑀 and 𝑍𝑆𝑀 > 𝑍𝑇𝑀. It implies that the 
green R&D subsidy c than the emission tax in a mixed market. Therefore, depending on the 
level of green R&D cost and spillover effect, green R&D subsidy can increase not only cost 
efficiency from the R&D investments and allocation efficiency from output production. 
Finally, social welfare under the green R&D subsidy in the mixed market is as follows: 
𝑊𝑆𝑀 = 𝐴2(68(1 + 𝛽)2 + 9𝛾)212(1 + 𝛽)2 + 81𝛾                                               (47) 
Lemma 4. 𝑠SM > 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑀 
It states that even in the presence of public firm, the optimal green R&D subsidy is always 
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higher than marginal environmental damage irrespective of the level of green R&D cost and 
spillover effect. This result is similar with Lemma 2. Thus, compared to emission tax, the 
government will set higher R&D subsidy rate than marginal environmental damage in order to 
increase more output production and more R&D investment.19 Note that the green R&D 
subsidy increases as either the green R&D cost or the spillover effect increases, i.e., 𝜕𝑠SM𝜕𝛾 > 0 
and 𝜕𝑠SM𝜕𝛽 > 0. 
4. 3. Comparisons 
We compare social welfare between under the emission tax and under the green R&D 
subsidy in the mixed market. 
Proposition 2.  𝑊𝑆𝑀 <> 𝑊𝑇𝑀 ⟺ 𝛾 >< 𝛾𝑀  where 𝛾𝑀 > γ and satisfies 𝑊𝑆𝑀 = 𝑊𝑇𝑀. 
It shows that the superiority of the regulatory instruments between the emission tax and the 
green R&D subsidy in a mixed market depends not only on the spillover effect but also on the 
level of the green R&D cost. In particular, social welfare under the emission tax can be higher 
(lower) than those under the green R&D subsidy with the high (low) green R&D cost. Note that 
the welfare thresholds, 𝛾𝑀, is increasing in the spillovers, i.e., 𝜕𝛾𝑀𝜕𝛽 > 0. 
V. Discussion: Privatization and Environmental Policy 
We now examine the government’s optimal policy choices and discuss the welfare effect 
of privatization policy. We first compare the emission taxes and the green R&D subsidies in 
between private and mixed markets.  
Proposition 3. 𝑡TM > 𝑡TP whereas 𝑠SM <> 𝑠SP ⟺ 𝛾 >< 44(1 + 𝛽)2 
It states that privatization policy reduces the levels of the emission tax whereas reduces 
                                           
19 If we put the equilibrium outcomes in (37) and (38) into (36) and (39), then from 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑧𝑖 − 𝛽𝑧𝑗, we have 𝑄SM(𝑠) = 𝐴(50(1+𝛽)2+27𝛾)+36𝑠(1+𝛽)94(1+𝛽)2+81𝛾 ,, 𝑍SM(𝑆) = 42𝐴(1+𝛽)+81𝑠94(1+𝛽)2+81𝛾 and 𝐸SM = 𝐴(8+16𝛽+8𝛽2+27𝛾)−45𝑠(1+𝛽)94+188𝛽+94𝛽2+81𝛾 . Then, we can 
show that 𝜕𝑄SM(𝑠)𝜕𝑠 > 0, 𝜕𝑍SM(𝑠)𝜕𝑠 > 0 and 𝜕𝐸SM(𝑠)𝜕𝑠 > 0.. 
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(increases) the level of green R&D subsidy with low (high) green R&D cost. 
On the one hand, under the emission tax policy, both output productions and R&D investments 
are higher in a mixed market than those in a private market because there exists an aggressive 
public firm in a mixed market. But, the amounts of both production and R&D investments are 
still lower than those of the first-best. After privatization, therefore, a lower emission tax is 
required to increase total outputs but a higher emission tax is required to increase R&D 
investments in a private market. In total, the former effect on the welfare outweigh the latter 
effect and thus privatization policy reduces the level of emission taxes.20  
On the other hand, under the green R&D subsidy policy, the level of output productions and 
R&D investments in mixed market is higher (lower) than those in private market with lower 
(higher) R&D cost. Also, the R&D subsidy induces more output productions and more R&D 
investments than the emission tax in both private and mixed markets. As a result, the amounts 
of both output productions and R&D investments might be higher than those of the first-best.21 
Therefore, depending on the green R&D cost, a lower or a higher green R&D subsidy is 
required after privatization. 
We now turn to the welfare consequences of privatization policy. 
Lemma 5. 𝛾𝑀 > 𝛾𝑃 for ∀𝛽 and ∀𝛾 
It shows that when comparing the welfare threshold between the emission tax and the green 
R&D subsidy in both private and mixed markets, the government requires a lower threshold of 
the green R&D cost for privatization. That is, the emergence of the public firm increases the 
threshold. It implies that the government might prefer to adopt the green R&D subsidy in the 
presence of public firm under certain conditions.  
For visual comparisons, [Fig. 1] shows the thresholds between 𝛾𝑀 and 𝛾𝑃 , which 
depend on the R&D spillovers, 𝛽. There exist three regions. The first is the lower region below 𝛾𝑃 with a lower R&D cost. The second is the upper region above 𝛾𝑀 with a higher R&D cost. 
The third is between 𝛾𝑀 and 𝛾𝑃 with the intermediate R&D cost. Hence, from Proposition 1 
                                           
20 This result is contrast to the results in Haruna and Goel (2019) who considered a reverse game structure where 
the firms decide their green R&D investments and then government chooses the emission taxes. In that case of 
time-inconsistency problem, the firms can choose more R&D investment opportunistically to induce the 
governments to reduce the tax level. Regarding time-inconsistency problem in environmental taxation, see also 
Leal, et al. (2018) and Garcia, et al. (2018). 
21 Note that 𝑄FB > 𝑄SM > 𝑄SP if 𝛾 < 43 (1 + 𝛽)2 and 𝑄FB < 𝑄SM < 𝑄SP if 𝛾 > 43 (1 + 𝛽)2. 
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and 2, the regions in which the emission tax (green R&D subsidy) is adopted by the government 
decreases (increases). 
 
[Fig. 1] Comparing 𝜸𝑴 and 𝜸𝑷 
In the first region of the lower R&D cost, 𝛾 < 𝛾𝑃, the green R&D subsidies in both private 
and mixed markets dominate the emission taxes, i.e., 𝑊SM > 𝑊TM  and 𝑊SP > 𝑊TP . 
Comparing 𝑊SM and 𝑊SP, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 4. In the region of the lower R&D cost, we have 𝑊SM > 𝑊SP for ∀𝛽 and ∀𝛾. 
It states that when the government adopts the green R&D subsidy policy, the mixed market 
always welfare-dominates the private market and thus privatization lowers social welfare under 
the lower R&D cost. As mentioned in Proposition 3, under the green R&D subsidy with the 
lower R&D cost, privatization policy induces less output productions and less R&D 
investments, which results in less social welfare. 
In the second region of the higher R&D cost, 𝛾 > 𝛾𝑀, the emission tax in both private 
and mixed markets dominates the green R&D, i.e., 𝑊SM < 𝑊TM  and 𝑊SP < 𝑊TP . 
Comparing 𝑊TM and 𝑊TP, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 5. In the region of higher R&D cost, we have 𝑊TM >< 𝑊TP for 𝛽 >< 𝛽𝑇 where 
18 
 
𝛽𝑇satisfies 𝑊TP = 𝑊TM and 𝛽T > 0 for 𝛾 > γM. 
It states that when the government adopts the emission tax policy, the efficiency of the 
privatization policy depends on the levels of green R&D cost and spillover effect. In [Fig. 2], 
when the spillover effect is weak, the government should privatize the inefficient public firm 
that produces more output productions than the private firm. However, when the spillover effect 
is strong, the government should retain a public firm because the public firm invests more R&D, 
which increases externalities, and thus the spillover effect dominates the loss from the high 
green R&D cost. 
 
[Fig. 2] Optimal Policy Choices 
In the third region of the intermediate R&D cost, 𝛾𝑃 < 𝛾 < 𝛾𝑀, the efficiency between 
the emission tax and the green R&D subsidy depends on the existence of the public firm. In a 
mixed market, the green R&D subsidy welfare-dominates the emission tax, i.e., 𝑊SM > 𝑊TM, 
while in a private market the emission tax welfare-dominates the green R&D subsidy, i.e., 𝑊TP > 𝑊SP. Then, comparing 𝑊SM and 𝑊TP, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 6. In the region of intermediate R&D cost, we have 𝑊𝑇𝑃 >< 𝑊𝑆𝑀 for 𝛾 >< 𝛾𝑇𝑃𝑆𝑀 
where 𝛾𝑇𝑃𝑆𝑀 satisfies 𝑊TP = 𝑊𝑆𝑀 and 𝛾𝑇𝑃𝑆𝑀  > 0. 
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It states that the government policies on the environmental regulation and privatization depend 
on the relative R&D cost. In [Fig. 2], specifically, when the R&D cost is relatively high, the 
government should privatize the inefficient public firm and adopt the emission tax policy. 
However, when the R&D cost is relatively low, the government should retain a public firm and 
adopt the green R&D subsidy because with the lower R&D cost, privatization policy induces 
less output productions and less R&D investments while R&D subsidy welfare-dominates the 
emission tax when 𝛾𝑃 < 𝛾 < 𝛾𝑀. 
Finally, summarizing the findings in Proposition 4, 5 and 6, [Fig. 2] shows the optimal 
policy choices between the privatization policy and environmental regulation.  
Proposition 7. Let 𝛾∗ = Min[𝛾𝑇𝑃𝑆𝑀, 𝛾𝑀]. 
(i) When γ < 𝛾 < 𝛾∗, then 𝑊SM is the highest welfare 
(ii) When 𝛾 > 𝛾∗, then 𝑊TM is the highest welfare if 𝛽 > 𝛽𝑇 while 𝑊TP is otherwise. 
It states that the optimal choices of government policy depends on the levels of green R&D cost 
and spillover effect. In specific, (i) the government should adopt the green R&D subsidy and 
keep the public firm under the lower R&D cost while (ii) adopt the emission tax and determine 
privatization policy depending on the R&D spillovers. The government should retain the public 
firm under the higher spillovers while privatize the public firm under the lower spillovers. 
The economic explanation is as follows: When the R&D cost is low, the environmental 
improvement from the direct R&D subsidy outweighs the welfare loss from the R&D cost. 
Further, the R&D subsidy policy is more effective in the presence of the public firm. However, 
when the R&D cost is high, the welfare loss from R&D cost outweighs the environmental 
improvement from the direct R&D subsidy. In that case, the emission tax policy is superior, but 
the welfare effect of privatization depends on the R&D spillovers. When spillover effect is 
weak, the government should privatize the public firm in order to reduce higher R&D 
investments from the public firm. But, as the spillover effect increases, the government can 
maintain the public firm to encourage the output productions and R&D investments.  
VI. Conclusion 
In this study, we considered the green R&D cost and R&D spillovers, and compared 
environmental regulations between an emission taxes and green R&D subsidies in private and 
mixed duopoly markets. We then showed that the green R&D subsidy is better (worse) than the 
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emission tax when the green R&D cost is low (high) irrespective of the R&D spillovers, 
whereas the existence of a public firm encourages the government to adopt the subsidy policy. 
Finally, we examined the optimal policy choices between the environmental regulation and 
privatization policy. We showed that when the R&D cost is high and the spillover rate is (not) 
weak, the government should choose the emission tax and (not) privatize the public firm. 
However, when the R&D cost is low, such a privatization policy is not desirable to society 
irrespective of the R&D spillovers. 
Our findings on the policy relation between market-oriented environmental regulations 
and privatization in oligopolies will provide clear policy importance for developing a 
sustainable green growth system. In particular, both the R&D spillovers and the effectiveness 
of the R&D cost are critical to assess the welfare effect of governmental policies. Therefore, 
the optimal combinations of green policy and privatization policy should be well-designed for 
the government in facilitating environmental innovation. 
There remain future research. The limitations of the simple duopoly model should be 
generalized in the further extensions. First, we could consider different market structures such 
as Stackelberg and Bertrand competition in the markets with differentiated products. Second, 
we assumed that the environmental concerns of the players such as consumers and firms are 
exogenous irrespective of R&D activities. We could extend this study to examine the inclusive 
case with environmental awareness or environmental corporate social responsibility. For 
example, recent evidence shows that more consumers prefer to buy environment-friendly 
products and more firms are participating in environmental corporate social responsibility.22 
This stimulates firms to carry out more environmental R&D investment in polluting industries. 
These research directions remain for future work.  
                                           
22 For example, Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Liu et al. (2015), Hirose et al. (2017), and Lee and Park (2019) 
explained how corporate environmentalism is desirable for both firms and society. 
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Appendix A. Lower boundary of the green R&D cost 
Let γTM satisfy equation (32) = 0 and γSM satisfy equation (47) = 0. Then, we can show γTM > γSM for ∀𝛽 and ∀𝛾, in [Fig. A1]. Hence, it is assumed that 𝛾 > γ = γTM. 
 
[Fig. A1] Lower boundary of the green R&D cost 
Appendix B. Proofs 
Lemma 1. 
We can derive that 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑃 = 4𝐴𝛾(5+𝛽+𝛾)64(1+𝛽)2+16(3+2𝛽)𝛾+7𝛾2. Then, we can easily show that: 𝑡TP − 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑃 = 𝐴𝛾(4(3𝛽−1)−𝛾)64(1+𝛽)2+16(3+2𝛽)𝛾+7𝛾2 <> 0 ⟺ 𝛾 >< 4(3𝛽 − 1)  
Lemma 2. 
We can derive that 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑃 = 𝐴𝛾4(1+𝛽)2+𝛾. Then, we can easily show that: 𝑠SP − 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑃 = 𝐴𝛽𝛾4(1+𝛽)2+𝛾 > 0 for ∀𝛽 and ∀𝛾.  
Proposition 1. 
We can derive that 𝑊𝑇𝑃 − 𝑊𝑆𝑃 = 𝐴2𝛾(9𝛾2+4(1+𝛽)(5−19𝛽)𝛾−128(1+𝛽)3)16(4(1+𝛽)2+𝛾)(64(1+𝛽)2+16(3+2𝛽)𝛾+7𝛾2). Then, we can show 
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that: 𝑊𝑇𝑃 >< 𝑊SP ⟺ 𝛾 >< 𝛾𝑃 = 2(1+𝛽)(√(313+𝛽(98+361𝛽))−(5−19𝛽))9 . 
Lemma 3. 
We can derive that: 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑀 = 2𝐴(8𝐿4(5+2𝛽)(199+40𝛽)+6𝐿2(9353+5446𝛽+872𝛽2)𝛾+9(5177+2𝛽(2099+604𝛽))𝛾2+5832𝛾3)𝐾 . 
Then, we can show that:  𝑡𝑇𝑀 − 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑀 = 6𝐴(8𝐿4(2+3𝛽)(199+40𝛽)+2𝐿2(530+𝛽(6337+1028𝛽))𝛾−3(626−𝛽(1745+184𝛽))𝛾2−486𝛾3)𝐾   
Let 𝛾𝑇𝑀 satisfy 𝑡𝑇𝑀 = 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑀 . Note that 𝛾𝑇𝑀 > γ for ∀𝛽 and ∀𝛾 . Then, we can show 
that: 𝑡𝑇𝑃 <> 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑃 ⟺ 𝛾 >< 𝛾𝑇𝑀  
Lemma 4.  
We can derive that: 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑀 = 8𝐴(1+𝛽)2+54𝐴𝛾212(1+𝛽)2+81𝛾.  Then, we can easily show that: 𝑠SM − 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑀 = 8𝐴(1+𝛽)2(8+11𝛽)+18𝐴(4+13𝛽)𝛾636(1+𝛽)2+243𝛾 > 0 for ∀𝛽 and ∀𝛾.  
Proposition 2. 
Let γM satisfy 𝑊𝑆𝑀 = 𝑊𝑇𝑀. Then, we can show γM > γ for ∀𝛽 and ∀𝛾 in [Fig. 1]. 
Proposition 3. 
We can easily show that 𝑡TM > 𝑡TP and 𝑠SM − 𝑠SP = 𝐴(1+𝛽)(352(1+𝛽)4+388(1+𝛽)2𝛾−9𝛾2)3(848(1+𝛽)4+536(1+𝛽)2𝛾+81𝛾2) . Then, 
can derive that 𝑠SM <> 𝑠SP ⟺ 𝛾 >< 44(1 + 𝛽)2 for ∀𝛽 and ∀𝛾. 
Lemma 5.  
It is easy to show that 𝛾𝑀 > 𝛾𝑃 for ∀𝛽 and ∀𝛾 in [Fig. 1].   
Proposition 4.  
We can easily show that 𝑊SM − 𝑊SP = 7(4𝐴(1+𝛽)2−3𝐴𝛾)216(848(1+𝛽)4+536(1+𝛽)2𝛾+81𝛾2) > 0 for ∀𝛽 and ∀𝛾. 
Proposition 5.  
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Let 𝛽𝑇satisfy 𝑊TP = 𝑊TM. Then, we can show 𝛽T > 0 for 𝛾 > γM in [Fig. 2]. 
Proposition 6.  
Let 𝛾𝑇𝑃𝑆𝑀satisfy 𝑊TP = 𝑊SM. Then, we can show 𝛾𝑃 < γTPSM for ∀𝛽 and ∀𝛾 in [Fig. 2]. 
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